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Abstract. We describe a number of strategies for a future service oriented 
market place. We describe the SLA’s role within the service framework, and 
how it enables customers to make value judgements regarding the quality of a 
service. We also discuss the complexity of too much choice from both the 
customer and provider points of view, and advocate a “discrete offer” approach. 
We discuss the “cost of negotiation” and argue that it must be carefully 
balanced with the cost, value and risk of the offering being negotiated for. We 
add to the negotiation analysis with presentation and discussion of some results 
showing a simulated Grid market place and show that it is possible for service 
providers to deny themselves work through attempting to offer a high quality 
guaranteed service. 
Keywords:  Service Oriented Architecture, Service Oriented Infrastructure, 
Grid Computing, Business, Service Level Agreement. 
1   Introduction 
Businesses are faced with increasing pressure to introduce products and services in 
increasingly shorter time scales and at reducing costs. This has led to great interest in 
technologies such as service oriented architectures (SOA) and its supporting service 
oriented infrastructure (SOI), grid computing, and the new range of software as a 
service (SAAS) offerings. Using such technologies it is hoped that businesses will be 
able to rapidly create new applications, either for use internally or for sale, from 
services that may be assembled and executed rapidly and economically. To achieve 
maximum economic benefit it is essential that the services are reused and that, as the 
technology matures, fewer are developed from scratch. This all leads to the 
supposition that there will be a market place for applications and services that will 
have a global reach and potential consumers of services will have to choose from such 
a global marketplace. In this paper we present some observations about the structure 
and characteristics of such a service marketplace and suggest strategies that we 
believe will lead to greater user satisfaction.   Strategies for the Service Market Place  59 
For the purposes of this paper, we define a service as: “the doing of work for the 
benefit of others”. We use this generic definition so as to concentrate on the business 
aspects of the provision of service rather than a technical definition (for example a 
Web Service). By definition services are intangible, and may not even exist before 
they are required. This means that the potential purchaser has limited opportunity to 
assess the quality of a service before use. Hence there is a need for the consumer to 
determine the nature of a service and whether it will live up to their expectations. This 
may be achieved through the use of service level agreements (SLAs), described next. 
2   The Role of SLAs  
Within the 6
th Framework IST project NextGRID we have proposed the use of 
bipartite (two-party) SLAs to describe both the functional and non-functional aspects 
of a service to allow consumers to make informed choices. An SLA is an agreement 
(as denoted by its name) and a contract for service is likely to be based on it, so the 
SLA describes to what each of its signatories is obliged to do in order to be compliant 
with the agreement (see [8]). The SLAs under development in NextGRID (also see 
[13]) are significantly different from what could be regarded as conventional SLAs in 
two main ways:  
•  NextGRID SLAs are expressed in terms of customer business benefit; and 
•  NextGRID SLAs may impose interdependent obligations on either party. 
These differences are discussed in detail below. 
We believe it is essential that the SLA have a strong end user benefit component, 
and that services being offered should be described in terms of their impact at the 
business level of the consumer, and not in terms of the technology supplied. The 
marketing benefits of this should be obvious – it is much easier to convince a 
financial decision maker of the benefits of a service that guarantees one of his key 
business processes using agreed metrics rather than one that guarantees the 
availability of, for example, a number of servers. We believe that the strong linkage to 
business impact benefits both the customer and provider, and this strong business 
linkage in the SLA structure is discussed in a previous publication [16]. The customer 
can then assign and manage costs transparently within their business and the service 
provider retains the flexibility in operations to strive to reduce the cost of delivery and 
ultimately the price paid by the customer. This view contrasts with the use of SLAs in 
the more established academic Grid community where the SLAs described in [2], [6] 
and [20] focus on resources (e.g. computers, network bandwidth, storage devices) 
rather than services. This is of course appropriate for a community of experienced 
users running often experimental codes. However, in order to address the needs of 
business (as opposed to technical) users the value of the service must be articulated at 
the appropriate – business – level rather than the resource level. The customer should 
not be concerned with the resources required to provide the service, just that the 
service exists and provides clear business benefit – management of resources should 
remain the domain of the service provider. Buco et al [1] concur with this view: 
“…The customer need not know the implementation details of the provider’s service 
level management (SLM) processes...”. Buyya et al [2] propose a “Grid Economy” in 60  P. McKee et al. 
which the focus is on the resources, low-level computational elements such as CPU, 
network and storage. Our position is that the value to the customer is at a higher level 
than the hardware. For example, application codes contain much more customer value 
than hardware, as they embody functionality that can solve customers’ problems. 
The second major characteristic of a NextGRID style SLA is that it recognises the 
fact that in a future service oriented marketplace application delivery will be 
collaborative and that SLAs need to recognise the impact of this collaboration. We 
advocate the notion of interdependent obligations that describe necessary pre-
conditions in order for the SLA to be valid, and that some obligations will be 
dependent on others. For example, if a customer wishes to outsource payroll 
processing and asks a service provider to guarantee that the payroll processing will 
always be completed by the 29
th of any month, it is entirely reasonable that the service 
provider place a pre-condition on the customer requiring that data be available 24hrs 
before the delivery deadline. The WSLA specification [19] also denotes the use of 
obligations, but does not determine that they may be dependent relationships, and 
how these relationships are dependent. Through the use of obligations the NextGRID 
SLA clearly sets out the expectations and obligations of both parties involved, and we 
believe is an essential component of a future electronic market place for services. 
3   The Dynamic Service Market Place and Choice 
Those who market products and services often assume that the more choice given to a 
customer, the more likely they are to find something that satisfies their requirements. 
At first glance it seems that this assumption is valid in a future service-based market 
place. We believe however that trying to offer a wide range of choices may turn out to 
be less successful than expected, and even counterproductive.  
Consider the role of a service provider in such a market. In order to deliver a 
service against an SLA the service provider will need to characterise the performance 
of the service in various operational conditions and at all combinations of the various 
quality parameters the customers may choose. For this, the service provider must 
produce automated management tools to ensure performance is maintained for all 
permutations. This is of course extremely difficult, expensive and slow. The customer 
will see increased costs to pay for these developments, and a reduction in the number 
of new and innovative services due to the complexity of the task. Although limiting 
the number of available products may seem counterintuitive, the advantages for 
controlling costs may be significant. Gottfredson and Aspinall [10] discuss the notion 
of the “innovation fulcrum” and its impact on a number of manufacturing activities. 
They describe how careful selection of options and minimisation of complexity leads 
to a more efficient business and that each business has an optimal number of products. 
If a business offers too few products they may miss out on customers, while offering 
too many products leads to greater complexity and unacceptably high management 
costs. A balance between adequate market coverage and limitation of complexity 
must be sought. 
As a service consumer the problems associated with too much choice may be 
equally severe. Faced with a service that contains a large number of potentially 
variable terms the end user is unlikely to be aware of the trade offs associated with   Strategies for the Service Market Place  61 
combinations of the various settings, and they may unwittingly specify a set of 
parameters that significantly increases the cost of the service without increasing the 
quality. Indeed the availability of a large number of parameters may in fact obscure 
which parameters are in fact important to them – as discussed by Twing [18] it is 
essential that SLA focus on critical service items that drive the business, and have 
clear financial implications. We regard this as further evidence supporting the need 
for SLAs to be described in terms of business benefits to the consumer. As the end 
user is a person, other non-technical problems may be observed. Iyengar and Lepper 
[14] have shown that when a customer has too much choice they do not always see 
this as a benefit and often they become less likely to buy anything at all, and the wider 
range of options often leads to dissatisfaction with the final choice. Customers often 
resort to very simple and non-optimal strategies to choose in such conditions, and this 
raises an interesting question for automated systems in that if the customer is unable 
to make the choice effectively in person, how can they program an automated system 
to achieve the best result for them? 
4   Discrete Offers – The Supermarket Approach 
If we consider the 20
th century approach to shopping much of the complexity has been 
removed from commodity purchases by some degree of standardisation. Many 
household purchases have standard pack sizes that facilitate both automated 
production (thereby reducing costs) and efficient comparison between products by the 
consumer. It is fairly easy for the customer to make a value judgement between two 
packets of different branded soap powder, for example. In addition, the prices of the 
goods would greatly increase if the customer had total freedom to specify their 
features. For these reasons, within the NextGRID project we have advocated the use 
of a “discrete offer” system for services. It should be noted that by “discrete offer” we 
do not mean one single offer, but that every service provider should offer services 
with fixed quantised service levels, each constituting a separate, “discrete” offering of 
their service. Customers may then have the confidence that the combination(s) of 
quality parameters offered will at least work, and that the service provider has created 
a suitable management infrastructure for each level of the service, hopefully leading 
to reduced costs.  
We recognise the fact that the commoditised approach will not be suitable for 
every situation and that there will be a continuum stretching from the simple 
purchasing of commodity services through to more complex fully negotiated 
contracts. The deciding factor governing which strategy is appropriate will be the cost 
incurred in the negotiation process versus the cost of the delivered service and this is 
discussed in the next section. 
5   The Cost of Negotiation 
The cost of negotiation comprises a significant part of what have been termed 
“transaction costs”, the roots of which were proposed in 1937 by Coase [5]. 
Transaction costs are (financial and otherwise) costs associated with the transaction 62  P. McKee et al. 
itself (for example costs associated with the process of procurement), not the item or 
service that is the subject of the transaction. We believe that the cost of negotiation 
must be carefully managed. Negotiation cost must be insignificant compared to the 
cost of the item or service being negotiated for. It is only worth spending much time, 
money and effort negotiating when the cost, value and risk associated with the item or 
service being negotiated for are significant. 
In line with the discussion in Section 0, the supermarket approach has no 
negotiation. The customer chooses from a set of discrete offers and pays the labelled 
price. This is appropriate because the vast majority of real-world supermarket items 
are low-cost and commoditised. Conversely, a high-value, high-cost, complex service 
contract will have a great deal of negotiation, as the end item is extremely expensive 
and the risks of not carefully working out the contact between the customer and 
provider are significant. In the real world, a contract for the construction of a football 
stadium would not go ahead without careful negotiation from all parties concerned. 
The costs, value and risks are too great to leave negotiation to chance. 
Applied to the Grid, there are a number of automated “discover, find and bind” 
protocols and demonstration systems (for example those described in [7] and [17]) 
some of which use software agents to perform the negotiation to gain access to the 
services being negotiated for. Whilst these are certainly useful, we assert that there 
must be a limit determined by the cost, risk and value of the negotiated item, above 
which humans must get involved. An organisation may be perfectly happy for 
software systems to take responsibility for low-value agreements, but humans must 
get involved when the stakes get higher, so that they can make more advanced 
decisions and take responsibility for their actions on behalf of their organisation. The 
greater the level of risk and investment, the greater the need there is for human 
decision making and responsibility. You cannot sue a computer because it made a 
promise your organisation cannot deliver! 
There are a number of factors that determine the total cost of negotiation, and 
measures that can be taken to control costs arising from each. 
 
1.  There is a significant time cost to the customer of searching for suppliers. 
This implies that customers should search for suppliers infrequently, and 
record any approved suppliers in an “approved supplier list”. 
2.  Many negotiation protocols use an “invite-tender” approach. This is where 
an invitation to tender is issued by a customer and providers respond to it. 
There is usually a significant delay in the issuance of the invitation and the 
delivery of the tenders. The delays make this a high-cost approach, and in 
general this should only used for high-cost bespoke services. It is useful for 
building long-term supply relationships e.g. when deciding who to include in 
an approved supplier list (see above). 
3.  The customer will have difficulty in comparing the value from offers from 
different providers – these are not likely to be directly comparable and thus 
the customer has to compare apples and oranges to determine which suits 
their needs best. This cost can be controlled by standardising the terms used 
in discrete offers – an approach used successfully by the supermarkets (see 
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4.  As discussed in Section 0, there is a significant risk to customer and provider 
of giving the customer too much freedom in choosing the service profile – 
what they choose may not be workable or be too costly to provide. Providers 
should restrict customers to an appropriate number of discrete offers. 
5.  There is a considerable time and risk cost to both customer and provider of 
iterative negotiation. Offers and counter-offers need to be computed and 
responded to, and there is the significant risk that there is no guarantee that 
iterative negotiation will converge. Providers can avoid this cost by making 
only discrete offers, allowing customers to choose between them but not to 
negotiate over their terms. 
6.  There is a considerable financial cost of any human interaction (decision 
making, responsibility, etc). Humans are much more costly than computers, 
and cannot handle large numbers of negotiations. Service providers and 
ideally also consumers should automate their procedures for managing offers 
and making agreements. 
In conclusion, providers and customers need to analyse the costs and potential risks 
of any negotiation they enter into and appropriately target resources. Depending on 
the situation, too much or too little attention to negotiation and customer choice can 
be costly or dangerous. 
6   Self Denial of Service 
In this section we briefly describe simulation results of an initial study into the 
behaviour of a “Grid market place”. The overall aim of this work was to arrive at a 
means of simulating or modelling a Grid market place, given that there was no real-
world information regarding how different actors operated in such a situation. 
This work builds on earlier work in the GEMSS project [9]. This investigated use 
of the WSLA schema [19] for SLAs along with FIPA negotiation protocols [15], in a 
business to business Grid middleware based on GRIA [11] (the current GRIA 
software downloadable from [11] uses the discrete offer approach and does not 
employ FIPA protocols). The GEMSS middleware was deployed and evaluated using 
only a small number of sites. Here, we aimed to find out how such a B2B approach 
would work on a larger scale, with full market competition between larger numbers of 
sites. 
Before starting the work, three options were considered for understanding Grid 
marketplace behaviour: direct measurement, analytical modelling and simulation. We 
chose a simulation based approach, as it was deemed to be the most flexible. 
Measurement was obviously not possible, and it was deemed that simulation allowed 
more “what-if” types of analysis to be performed than modelling.  
We based the simulator code on the GridSim toolkit [3], [12] with appropriate 
extensions. There are two main actors in the simulation – users and service providers. 
The business goal for users is to get some (compute-based) work performed within a 
deadline. Hence, for the users we added a negotiation capability with service 
providers. The users issue requests for work consisting of a workload and a deadline 
by which the workload needs to be processed, evaluate responses from providers, and 
select the most appropriate based on a utility function. The workload is specified in 64  P. McKee et al. 
units relative to a hypothetical “standard machine”, and all actors in the simulation 
use the same metric and units to represent the demands of users and the capacity of 
providers. When evaluating offers from providers, the users differentiate between the 
offers using a cost-time selection strategy. The cost-time algorithm is described in [4], 
and has price as the major factor but run-time is taken into account where providers 
cost about the same. 
The business goal of the service provider is to provide compute services that 
process the users’ workloads within the required timeframes. For the service provider 
we added two major extensions. Firstly, we added the capability to negotiate with 
users. The providers receive requests and make offers, containing the commitment to 
perform work for the user and a price. The offers expire after a specific time (denoted 
as Op – the offer validity period), and users may only accept them within this time. 
Secondly, we eliminated the disclosure of status by service providers. In the original 
GridSim, the users are aware of the internal resource utilisation of the service 
providers. In a market situation, this is clearly not desirable for the service provider, 
as it gives the user an advantage in any negotiation. Here, the only information users 
are aware of is whether a provider can complete the work inside a given deadline, and 
what it will cost the user. There is no communication of the resources used by the 
provider, only whether the provider can satisfy the user’s requirements. 
The scenario chosen models the following situation. In a future large scale 
dynamic market place it will be trivial for potential customers to request quotations 
from large numbers of suppliers at frequent intervals in the hope of spotting price 
trends, or windows of opportunity for low cost operation. It is easy to imagine 
automated software continually evaluating the providers for bargains. If the service 
providers commit their resources to offers when making those offers, so as to provide 
a high-quality, “guaranteed” service, they will be exposed to the significant risk of 
self-denial of service through committing resources for offers that are not taken up.  
We chose a population of 80 users and 20 service providers for this scenario. The 
ratio between the number of clients and service providers is based on the assumption 
that in a marketplace of this type (SME clients and larger service providers) there will 
be significantly more clients than service providers. The population used here was 
dictated by the need to have enough providers to allow some variation between them, 
but not so many users that the simulation was impracticably slow. 
The service provider population comprises different types, categorized in terms of 
the number of processing units, the price, and the speed of the processing units: 
•  Size: Big (9 units), Medium (3 units) and Small (1 unit); 
•  Speed: Fast (20 times a “standard” e.g. client machine) and Slow (10 times a 
standard machine); and 
•  Price: varies between 2½ cents and 7½ cents per hour on a ‘standard’ 
machine. 
To create service providers’ profiles, all combinations of the above categories were 
initially considered. We then eliminated the non-realistic ones – for example we can 
see that a small, low priced service provider is not realistic because it will not create 
enough revenue to survive. We also excluded slow, low capacity, expensive service 
providers, since they are very unlikely to succeed in a competitive market. The 
service providers’ distribution thus reflects a marketplace in which large service   Strategies for the Service Market Place  65 
providers exploit the economies of scale to reduce their costs and therefore attract the 
majority of the business. However, we have included some medium and small 
providers as well to study their impact on the market. The final service providers’ 
profiles are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Service providers’ profiles & parameters 
Size - Speed - Price  Number of 
service 
providers 
Number of 
processors
Processor 
rate 
(multiple of 
standard 
processor 
unit) 
Price per 
processor 
- hour 
Equivalent 
standard 
processor -
hour price  
Big - Slow - Low  3  9  10  € € 0.25 € € 0.025 
Big - Fast - Low  2  9  20  € € 0.50 € € 0.025 
Medium - Slow - Low  3  3  10  € € 0.25 € € 0.025 
Medium - Fast - Low  1  3  20  € € 0.50 € € 0.025 
Big - Slow - Very High  1  9  10  € € 0.75 € € 0.075 
Big - Fast - High  2 9 20 € € 1.00 € € 0.050 
Medium - Fast - High  3 3 20 € € 1.00 € € 0.050 
Small - Fast - High  5 1 20 € € 1.00 € € 0.050 
We used one key principal for service providers’ operation. When making an offer, 
the service providers commit resources sufficient to process the workload requested 
by the user and by the user’s deadline. The offer is valid for the duration of Op. After 
this time, any resources committed for offers that are not accepted are released and 
can be offered again. Until then, resources committed to an offer may not be used to 
back up a new offer, thus ensuring that the service providers do not over-commit their 
resources. 
The simulations were used to investigate the effect of varying Op on the 
distribution of work across different providers. Figure 1 shows the situation where Op 
is 3456 seconds and shows the amount of outsourced work processed by each of our 
population of 20 service providers (described in Table 1). In Figure 1, the service 
providers are denoted by a number and code: 
SIZE{Big|Medium|Small} SPEED{Slow|Fast} PRICE{Low|High|V.High}) 
Due to the users’ cost-time minimisation strategy (minimise cost then use time to 
sort any equal-cost providers) we expect the cheapest service providers to get most 
work. The fastest should also achieve the highest utilisation, since their resources are 
committed for the least time, and they should be most often in a position to make new 
offers. Figure 1 shows this effect: SP01 to SP05 inclusive are highly utilized, and 
within this set the fast providers (SP04 and SP05) are more highly utilised. 
Naively, we would expect the work to be shared amongst all the low-priced 
providers, but we are seeing here that SP09 gets very little and SP06-SP08 get none, 
even though they are all low-priced. Yet some expensive providers (SP11 and SP12) 
are winning a great deal of work (they are above 80% utilised). 66  P. McKee et al. 
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Fig. 1. Utilisation for different service provider types for Op = 3456 seconds 
This is due to the relative agility of these service providers. When providers make 
offers, they must commit resources for as long as the offers are valid. Hence the low-
capacity (medium size and below) service providers commit all their resources much 
sooner than the larger ones and as a consequence cannot make as many offers as 
higher capacity providers. Thus the lower capacity providers are considerably less 
agile and unable to compete, even though their low price should make them attractive 
to customers.  
If we reduce Op we get a significant change in the work distribution. Figure 2 
shows the results of a simulation where Op was reduced to 1440 seconds. 
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Fig. 2. Utilisation for different service provider types for Op = 1440 seconds   Strategies for the Service Market Place  67 
The major change is that now SP09 (medium size, fast and low-price) is winning 
much more work (it is now over 90% utilised). SP09 was previously prevented from 
winning much work because its resources were fully committed, and by the time they 
became free the more expensive but more agile SP11-SP12 had won most of the 
work. SP09 is now only committing its resources for 1440 seconds, and is thus able to 
make more offers and win much more work. The expensive providers SP11 and   
SP12 still do quite well, but lose out whenever SP09 is in a position to compete with 
them. 
In Figure 3, Op is further reduced, this time to 720 seconds, and we see another 
shift in the work distribution following the trend of the lower capacity workers 
winning work.  
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Fig. 3. Utilisation for different service provider types for Op = 720 seconds 
SP06-08 are now starting to win against SP11 and SP12. Even though they have 
very low capacity, the further reduction of Op means that they can make enough offers 
in order to stand a good chance of some getting accepted. 
Note that low capacity providers become more viable with shorter offer validity 
periods, even though the more expensive but more agile competitors also use the 
shorter offer validity period. We did not simulate different Op for each provider, but it 
is clear that there will be some advantage in cutting it relative to competitors, though 
only to the point where customers find it too short. 
Note also that shortening Op further does not further improve the situation for the 
low-agility providers. By optimising the simulation it became possible to reduce Op  
to only 5 seconds. Figure 4 shows that although SP06 to SP08 do a little better, they 
still cannot achieve the same utilisation as the more agile and expensive SP11 and  
SP12. 
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Fig. 4. Utilisation for different service provider types for Op = 5 seconds 
We conclude that there is a significant business risk to the commitment of 
resources when making offers, as it makes a provider highly sensitive to the duration 
of the validity of the offer. The problem for the service providers is in the relationship 
between their provisioning and negotiation strategies – do they overbook their 
resources in the hope that some of their offers get turned down, or do they price their 
service accounting for the offers that are not taken up?  
This is common in resource-intensive real business. It is well-known that airlines 
routinely overbook their planes to account for “no-shows”, and the terms of the 
contract they have with their customers states that the customers paying the cheaper 
prices (usually in economy class) may not get a seat on the plane (this is known as 
“bumping”). 
It seems clear that the best way to operate services is by targeting a range of 
customer groups with a range of different service offers that provide different levels 
of guarantee (sometimes none at all) at different prices. These would have to be 
encoded in machine readable SLAs so negotiation can be automated on both sides. 
The SLAs will need to be much more sophisticated than hitherto, as there will be 
times when services are not taken up, or are taken up but then not delivered. This also 
implies a more sophisticated approach to manage the services and resources, in which 
failure to deliver service is an option, and decisions will be needed as to which 
services should be maintained. Clearly, there is a need to reduce complexity as much 
as possible, which suggests that the discrete offer approach should be used by service 
providers. It is also clear that commitment of resources during negotiation will add to 
the complexity, and that negotiation protocols should not depend on this. 
7   Conclusions 
In this paper, we have considered strategies for service oriented future markets. This 
work has come out of discussion, research and thinking into what is currently called   Strategies for the Service Market Place  69 
the “Grid”, and looks like it will evolve into a service oriented market, and hence the 
emphasis on services in this paper. 
We have discussed the difficulty consumers have in judging the quality of an 
intangible an un-experienced service. The well-known solution is the service level 
agreement (SLA), and we describe the SLA’s role within the service framework. Our 
chief findings are twofold. Firstly, an SLA and service providers’ offerings must use 
terms understandable to and clearly having benefit for customers. Secondly, an SLA 
should contain interdependent obligations that all its signatories (not just the service 
provider) agree to. 
We have advocated a “discrete offer” approach for service providers. We argue 
that if customers are given too much choice, they are likely to get overwhelmed by 
the permutations available to them, and may produce unworkable combinations of 
service factors. In addition, it has been argued that there is an “innovation fulcrum” - 
an optimum point between adequate market coverage and enough simplicity and 
manageability. 
We have discussed the cost of negotiation and argue that it must be carefully 
balanced with the cost, value and risk of the offering being negotiated for. We have 
taken this further using simulations of a Grid market place, which show that it is 
possible for service providers to deny themselves work through attempting to offer a 
high quality guaranteed service. This illustrates that ‘transaction costs’ are not limited 
to the actual cost of a transaction process, but may also need to take account of the 
impact on business agility and opportunity costs. We conclude by determining that 
there should be different levels of service related to price targeting different customer 
needs, and presented to customers as discrete offers, with minimal negotiation and 
minimal pre-commitment of resources until an SLA is agreed. 
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